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This thesis examines the current American criminal justice system, which demonstrates the 
phenomenon of Black over-criminalization within the United States of America. According to 
current statistics, African-Americans make up 40% of those incarcerated, but only comprise of 
about 13% of the total U.S. population. Many scholars have attributed African-Americans’ 
overrepresentation within the criminal justice system to factors such as poverty, unequal criminal 
policies, and racial discrimination. These factors play a huge part on African-Americans' chances 
of being a part of the criminal justice system, but it is not enough to just acknowledge this. It is 
necessary for one to look at further implications of these factors. What exactly do these factors 
affect? What does it mean to say that one was discriminated against? In my thesis, I analyze 
these questions as they relate to the concept of agency. The major question my thesis serves to 
answer is, “are current legal interpretations sufficient for analyzing the agency and criminal 
responsibility of African-Americans?” I answer this question through an analysis of a current 
court case in which I apply my own definition of agency. My definition of agency involves a 
connection between race and crime. Through an analysis of three historical cases, I show how 
race has consistently played a major influence on African-Americans’ agency and criminal 
responsibility. Thus, it is important to recognize this long-time racial influence within the 
criminal justice system in order to solve African-Americans’ overrepresentation within the 
criminal justice system. I show this importance through the development of my unique definition 
of agency. I end my thesis with policy recommendations within the current American criminal 
justice system as well within institutions that it directly affects in order to reverse the societal 





The United States prides itself on freedom, fairness, and equality, but its criminal justice 
system is a direct contradiction of these most prized values. For instance, the current population 
of the American criminal justice system consists of 40% African-Americans1, but in 2008, 
African-Americans represented only 13%2 of the total U.S. population. If we were to go a little 
further in history, we would find that in 2004, there were more Black males incarcerated in the 
U.S. (4,919 per 100,000) than there were in South Africa under the apartheid regime (851 per 
100,000 in 1993)3. South Africa, under apartheid was internationally condemned for its racist 
policies that oppressed South African Blacks. The fact that there existed over five times as many 
Black males incarcerated in the U.S. than in South Africa under apartheid is appalling and shows 
the injustice of the American criminal justice system. Going even further into history, we will 
see that this disproportionate criminal status of African-Americans is not a new phenomenon. It 
existed in 2001 when 16% of African-American males were current or former prisoners4 and in 
2000, when more African-American men were in prison than in higher education, 791,600 vs. 
603,032 respectively5
                                                 
1 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 3. 
. This high incarceration rate is not unique to African-American males but 
is also seen amongst African-American women. African-American women are incarcerated at an 
extreme rate compared to their female White counterparts. In 2000, African-American women 
2 U.S. Census Bureau: <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/p20.html#black> 
3 Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2004 as quoted in Prison Policy: 
<http://www.prisonpolicy.org/articles/notequal.html> 
4 Guardian:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/19/usa.garyyounge 
5 Stop The Drug War: <http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/252/jpistudy.shtml> 
were incarcerated at rates between 10-35 times greater than the rates of White women in fifteen 
states6
There is much debate about the causes of the overrepresentation of African-Americans 
within the criminal justice system and many attribute this phenomenon to factors such as poverty 
and racial discrimination. Michael W. Markowitz and Delores D. Jones-Brown express the 
significance of racial discrimination in determining criminal responsibility and punishment for 
African-Americans in their book The System in Black and White: Exploring the Connections 
Between Race, Crime, and Justice. Katherine Beckett and Theodore Sasson’s The Politics of 
Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America argue that criminal policies, such as those of the 
“War on Poverty” campaign, cause high incarceration rates for African-Americans. Bruce 
Western explores the effects of both policies and poverty on mass incarceration rates of African-
Americans in his book Punishment and Inequality in America. I chose these works due to their 
importance of explaining the injustice of the disproportionate representation of African-
Americans within the criminal justice system. Although each of these works demonstrates 
various causes of this phenomenon, they do not explain how African-Americans’ agency is 
affected by these causal factors. The knowledge of one’s agency during the time of the criminal 
act is important for legal actors to determine proper criminal responsibility and punishment. My 
.  These strikingly high incarceration rates from 2000 to 2008 are just a smaller scope of 
the constant trend of a disproportionate criminal status among African-Americans in recent 
history; thus, it is apparent that a serious reconsideration of the criminal justice system is 
necessary. This reconsideration involves an examination of some of the causes of the 
disproportionate criminal status of African-Americans as well an analysis of African-Americans’ 
agency. 
                                                 
6  Human Rights Watch:< http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/02/26/us-incarceration-rates-reveal-striking-racial-
disparities> 
thesis will include a unique definition of agency that will recognize racial discrimination, 
poverty, and criminal policies as contributing factors to the overrepresentation of African-
Americans within the criminal justice system, but will also show how these factors can limit the 
agency of African-Americans—thus arguing for a change in how legal actors view criminal 
responsibility.   
The concept of agency has been debated for many years. C.A. Strong defines agency as 
the process of deliberation in his 1918 scholarly piece titled “Fate and Free Will.” He defines 
sufficient agency as the ability to refrain from acting upon one’s initial thought. In his 1975 
journal article “Free Action and Free Will,” Gary A. Watson defines agency as a ranking criteria 
in which one is not free unless one is able to do what one most values. Later in a 1993 essay, 
R.A. Duff defines sufficient agency in three criteria: the knowledge of the outcome of one’s 
actions, the opportunity to avoid an action if chosen, and the concept of free opportunity, which 
states that one should not be “deprived of the opportunity to obey the law.” 7
In order to solve the problem of the overrepresentation of African-Americans within the 
criminal justice system, my definition of agency will serve as a standard for legal actors to 
 This deprivation 
arises when one acquires undesirable consequences from obeying that law. Although each 
interpretation provides major insights into the philosophical debate of agency and highlights 
different time periods in which this school of thought has evolved and expanded, they focus on 
agency in general terms instead of connecting it with race and crime. The connection of race, 
crime, and agency are essential for determining criminal responsibility for African-Americans 
because as statistics has shown, race plays a major role in their criminalization. Unlike these 
philosophical interpretations, my definition of agency illuminates this connection.  
                                                 
7 Duff, R.A. “Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 12, No.4 (1993): 345-383 
 
adhere to when assigning criminal responsibility punishment for African-Americans. My agency 
chapter defines agency through the idea of highly-valued options, absence of coercion, and the 
concept of reason. Highly-valued options arise from the objective American values of self-
preservation, self-sufficiency, and opportunity. I will examine these values through the context 
of environment. An environment that consists of highly-valued options is one that includes 
sufficient employment, quality education, and a low crime rate. All of these factors contribute to 
the American values of self-sufficiency, self-preservation, and opportunity. Coercion consists of 
institutional and policy restrictions on African-Americans’ agency through my examination of 
the effects of felon laws in my agency chapter. Sufficient reasoning includes the cognitive ability 
to fully understand one’s actions, which develops through maturity.8
I should make clear the reason why my definition of agency focuses on African-
Americans specifically, especially since the factors of poverty, coercion, and reason cross 
various groups. My focus on African-Americans is due to the higher incarceration rates this 
group receives in comparison to others. For instance, Black males have a 16.2% chance of being 
 This unique definition of 
agency explains the disproportionate criminal status of African-Americans as a disregard for 
their sufficient agency, which requires highly-valued options, lack of coercion, and sufficient 
reasoning. This new definition, if taken as a policy initiative within the criminal justice system, 
would allow for proper assigning of criminal responsibility and just punishment within the 
current American criminal justice system because it would require that legal actors examine a 
person’s whole—including external factors that affect their choices--and not just a focused on 
the criminal act itself. 
                                                 
8Although the concept of reason is essential for my definition of agency due to the importance for one to become 
fully aware of his or her available options as well as to have the ability to completely understand one’s choices 
before blame is assigned, the case that I analyze (Washington v. Poole (2007)) does not effectively highlight this 
criterion and so I do not focus on it during my analysis. I assumed that a lack of sufficient reasoning was not an 
issue in this case. 
incarcerated versus 9.4% chance for Hispanic males and 2.5% chance for White males.9 In the 
arena of criminal policies, African-Americans are also negatively affected at a higher rate than 
any other group as cited by the organization Drug Policy in their 1999 “Race and the Drug War” 
article: “Although African Americans comprise only 12.2 percent of the population and 13 
percent of drug users, they make up 38 percent of those arrested for drug offenses and 59 percent 
of those convicted of drug offenses.”10
I further explore in my second chapter the racial influence of African-Americans’ 
criminalization through a historical analysis of three court cases in order to demonstrate the 
significance of race over time in terms of defining agency and assigning criminal responsibility 
in the American criminal justice system. I analyze cases from the antebellum period (State v. 
Caesar (1840)), the Jim Crow Era (State v. Johnson (1913)), and post-1960’s (McCleskey v. 
Kemp (1987)). These time periods encompass major focal points in African-American history: 
slavery, segregation, and post-modern civil rights era. I chose all of these cases because they 
involve African-American defendants on trial for criminal actions while also demonstrating the 
variance in the role race plays in determining criminal agency for African-Americans.  
 Due to the heavy influence of racial discrimination, 
African-Americans’ experiences and limitations on their agency are unique and although my 
definition of agency can be applied to all, the purpose of this thesis is to find a solution to the 
phenomenon of the overrepresentation of African-Americans within the criminal justice system. 
By offering a standard for assigning criminal responsibility, which involves legal actors 
examining external impediments to defendants’ agency such as racial discrimination, my 
definition of agency will serve as a solution to this phenomenon.   
                                                 
9 Bureau of Justice Statistics: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/  
10 Drug Policy: http://www.drugpolicy.org/communities/race/  
After the historical analysis, my thesis then transitions into my application chapter. This 
chapter involves an analysis of a current court case that highlights my definition of agency. The 
major question my thesis serves to answer is, “Are current legal interpretations of agency 
sufficient for evaluating criminal responsibility for African-Americans? And if not, is a new 
interpretation of agency that involves the concepts of race and crime necessary?” I analyze the 
case of Washington v. Poole (2007) in order to determine if the legal interpretation of 
Washington’s agency was sufficient for  assigning him criminal responsibility.11
When I apply my definition of agency to the Washington v. Poole (2007) case, I will 
highlight two components of my definition of agency (highly-valued options and coercion).
 I apply my 
definition of agency to this case in order to test its practicality and sufficiency for assigning 
criminal responsibility for African-Americans.  
12
My thesis then concludes with proposed policy changes within the criminal justice 
system. I propose that the criminal justice system honor my interpretation of agency as a 
preferred method for use when considering mitigating factors in assigning criminal responsibility 
 
Washington is a repeated felon convicted of theft and through speculation I will show how it is 
possible that his environment lacked highly-valued options and the restrictions placed on him by 
felon policies may have limited his criminal agency. Felon policies play the role of coercion in 
my definition and the act of committing theft is shown as a result of a lack of highly-valued 
options in one’s environment. I will also show how this restriction of agency may be further 
limited when coupled with racial discrimination. Therefore, Washington v. Poole (2007) shows 
the necessary connection of race, crime, and agency.  
                                                 
11 The race of the defendant is unknown due to limitations in the record so I speculated the effects of race on agency 
through the use of statistical evidence of the racial influence on felon laws and environmental status. 
12 Reasoning is not a focus here because in Washington v. Poole (2007) his level of reasoning was not shown to be 
an issue and so it is suggested that Washington exercised sufficient reasoning.  
and punishment for African-Americans. Although there currently exist mitigating factors when 
considering criminal responsibility and punishment for defendants, they are not consistent. 
Often-times legal actors have sole discretion in their judgments, creating a variance in considered 
mitigating factors. The system would be more efficient if mitigating factors were consistent 
across courts instead of having one person convicted of a crime and another excused from this 
same crime due to a consideration of a mitigating factor that one judge recognized while another 
did not. My definition of agency will allow for this consistency. If implemented, environmental, 
policy, and racial factors will be considered by all courts when examining the criminal agency of 
defendants.  I predict that the recognition of these new mitigating factors as a standard for 
determining criminal responsibility will drastically reduce the overrepresentation of African-
Americans within the criminal justice system. This would allow for the consistency of America’s 
most prized values of fairness, freedom, and equality.  
I also propose policy changes within institutions that are indirectly affected by the 
criminal justice system, such as the public educational system and city employment. The 
educational system has an inverse relationship to the criminal justice system. Statistics have 
shown that more funding for education will reduce the number of drop outs and therefore the 
number of criminals: “between 1985 and 2000, the increase in state spending on corrections was 
nearly double that of the increase to higher education ($20 billion versus $10.7 billion), and the 
total increase in spending on higher education by states was 24% compared with 166% for 
corrections.”13
                                                 
13 Quoted in Stop the War on Drugs: http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/252/jpistudy.shtml 
 These statistics show that more funds are spent incarcerating an individual who in 
many cases is a child, than on educating that child. An increase in educational funding will also 
provide the highly-valued option of education within many impoverished urban areas, thus 
expanding the agency of many African-Americans. This expansion of agency due to an increase 
in highly-valued options is also seen with economic opportunities such as employment. The 
presence of sufficient employment in one’s environment allows for self-preservation, which will 
be shown to be effective at preventing crime. Therefore, I propose that the criminal justice 
system acknowledge my unique definition of agency in order to ensure justice, and that states 
redistribute funds from prisons to schools. This would not only be economically viable for states 
and their citizens, but also an act towards better humanity as the overrepresentation of African-
Americans within the criminal justice system becomes drastically reduced.  
Agency  
 
The connections between agency, race and crime are essential when analyzing the agency 
of African-Americans. The concept of agency has been debated for many years, yet few have 
explicitly connected race and crime with agency. This missing connection is unfortunate because 
as historical analysis and present-day statistics show, race is inextricably linked with crime. 
Devah Pager, author of Marked, has pointed out that “Blacks in this country have long been 
regarded with suspicion and fear; but unlike progressive trends in other racial attitudes, 
associations between race and crime have changed little in recent years.”14
The first measure of this unique definition of agency involves an examination of one’s 
environment in terms of the availability of highly-valued options.  Highly-valued options rely on 
the objective American principles of self-preservation, self-sufficiency, freedom, and 
 This long-term racial 
link with crime creates a necessary connection between race and agency when examining the 
criminal actions of African-Americans. Therefore, it is only logical that I present a definition of 
agency that involves this necessary connection. My interpretation of agency measures African-
Americans’ agency in three contexts: environment, policy, and reason.  
                                                 
14 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 3. 
opportunity. As a means of achieving sufficient agency, the measurement of highly-valued 
options requires that one’s environment consist of options that ensure long-term self-
preservation, the opportunity for self-sufficiency, and the freedom to acquire these values 
without threats. These American principles are assigned to the American values of education, 
employment, and safety. An environment that consists of highly-valued options is one that 
includes both sufficient employment and educational opportunities. Sufficient employment and 
educational opportunities allow for self-sufficiency and long-term self-preservation through the 
maintaining of one’s well-being. An environment with highly-valued options has little to no 
criminal opportunity. Little to no crime creates a safe environment, which means that there is 
greater assurance of self-preservation. This inverse relationship between crime in an area and the 
assurance of self-preservation is expressed in a 2008 TIME Magazine article which explains that 
“anyone who looks over their shoulder walking home late at night in a big city, the idea that 
America has won its war on violent crime might seem absurd.”15
                                                 
15 Ferkenhoff, Eric. “How Low Can the Crime Rate Go?” Time Magazine 18 Jan 2008. 7 Dec. 2010.  
 Here, crime is expressed as a 
threat to self-preservation as described by looking over one’s shoulder. Thus, urban areas with 
high crime rates pose a threat to self-preservation. This shows that urban areas, at least those 
with high crime rates, limit the agency of those residing within by prohibiting the option for 
long-term self-preservation. 
  I chose the American values of employment, education, and safety to represent highly-
valued options because these are factors that all Americans value in their search for a place of 
residence. For instance, these are factors, more or less, that drove the Great Migration of 
African-Americans from the South to the North for a better life filled with opportunities: 
“African American migration was affected by the "push and pull" factors…An important natural 
< http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1705342,00.html> 
force was the destruction of the cotton crop by the Boll Weevil forcing farmers, sharecroppers 
and tenants off the land…The pull in the North came from the labor needs of expanding 
industries stimulated by World War I.16 African-Americans’ agency was limited in the South due 
to a lack of highly-valued options in their southern environment. This included a lack of 
sufficient employment that would allow for long-term self-preservation and self-sufficiency as 
well as a lack of safety that would do the same: “A crucial unnatural force was the rise of the Ku 
Klux Klan gangs, which terrorized and intimidated African Americans.”17 Thus, a great influx 
(one quarter)18
An example of an environment that lacks these highly-valued options for African-
Americans is the impoverished, urban areas of America. African-Americans are overwhelming 
represented in urban areas or big cities due to the Great Migration: “there has been an enormous 
movement from rural areas to the cities by all Americans but this is especially true of African 
Americans… During this period [The Great Migration (1910-1930)], large racially homogeneous 
areas of African Americans developed in places such as Harlem in New York and the Southside 
of Chicago… Today the vast majority of African Americans live in the urban areas.”
 of African-Americans migrated from the South to the North in search of these 
highly-valued options of employment, education, and safety. An environment without these 
highly-valued options limits the agency of those within because they are coerced to choose from 
alternatives that they would otherwise not choose in order to satisfy the principles of self-
preservation, self-sufficiency, freedom, and opportunity.  
19
                                                 
16 African Americans and Urban America: <http://www.africawithin.com/jeffries/aapart33.htm> 
 African-
Americans migrated from the rural South to the industrial North in hopes of obtaining highly-
valued options. Unfortunately, the urban areas in which African-Americans currently reside are 
17 African Americans and  Urban America:< http://www.africawithin.com/jeffries/aapart33.htm> 
18 African Americans and  Urban America: <http://www.africawithin.com/jeffries/aapart33.htm> 
19 African Americans and Urban America:< http://www.africawithin.com/jeffries/aapart33.htm> 
missing these highly-valued options. The World Bank characterizes impoverished, urban areas as 
an environment with “limited access to employment opportunities and income… violent and 
unhealthy environments… [and] limited access to adequate health and education 
opportunities.”20
One may argue that some people who also live in impoverished, urban environments do 
not choose crime as an option. Although this is true, this does not counter the fact that these 
impoverished environments restrict people from exercising sufficient agency, including those 
who do not commit crime. For instance, when faced with the following options: poor school, 
insufficient employment, and drug-trafficking, one may choose to attend the poor school while 
another chooses the insufficient employment that provides little income and security and another 
chooses the option of drug-selling. Each option is different, but results in the same outcome: 
ultimately, a lack of self-sufficiency and long-term self-preservation. A poor school is less likely 
to lead to sufficient employment, which would lead to self-sufficiency and self-preservation. An 
insufficient employment is not enough for one to sustain oneself, thus making self-sufficiency 
and long-term self-preservation virtually impossible. Engaging in criminal activities such as 
drug-trafficking initially seems attractive to some due to the possibility of a high economic return 
in the short-term, but nonetheless fails to satisfy long-term self-sufficiency and self-preservation 
due to the high possibility of incarceration or worse, death. In other words, the cost of crime 
 The World Bank defines impoverished, urban areas as one that restricts the 
agency of those residing within due to the “limited access” to educational and employment 
opportunities versus the expansive opportunities for violent and unhealthy activities such as 
crime. Due to factors such as the Great Migration, African-Americans are overwhelmingly 
affected by these agency limiting areas. 
                                                 
20 World Bank: 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/EXTURBANPOVERT
Y/0,,contentMDK:20227679~menuPK:473804~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:341325,00.html> 
outweighs the benefits. Therefore, regardless of which options one chooses within an 
impoverished, urban environment, one’s agency is limited due to the lack of long-term self-
preservation and self-sufficiency. Another criterion that creates a limitation on one’s agency is 
that of coercion from criminal policies. Coercion within my interpretation of agency is measured 
by the institutional and policy forces on African-Americans’ agency. Although various criminal 
policies have this coercive effect on African-Americans, I focus on the current felon 
disenfranchisement laws because they best highlight this restriction. 
According to the Sentencing Project, felon disenfranchisement laws are “obstacles to 
participation in democratic life.”21 Current felon disenfranchisement laws restrict opportunities 
to voting, employment, and education for inmates and ex-offenders, including those on parole 
and probation as well as those who have completed their sentences. In thirty-five states, felon 
restrictions are imposed upon those on parole and in thirty states upon those who are on 
probation, while ten states restrict voting from those who have fully completed their sentences 
(neither on parole nor probation).22 Felon disenfranchisement laws have a disproportionate effect 
on African-Americans: “nearly two million African-Americans-or 8.25 percent of the African-
American population-are disenfranchised, a rate three times the national average.”23 This 
disproportionate status is even more overwhelming among African-American males: “1. 4 
million African-American men, or 13% of black men, are disenfranchised, a rate seven times the 
national average.”24
                                                 
21 The Sentencing Project: <http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133> 
 These high rates of a disenfranchised African-American minority suggest a 
racial motivation behind felon disenfranchisement laws.  
22 Quoted in Requests for Hearing in Sentencing Project: 
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_IACHRHearingRequest.pdf> 
23See “Requests for a Thematic Hearing” in Sentencing Project: 
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_IACHRHearingRequest.pdf> 
24 See “Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States” in Sentencing Project:  
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinusMarch2010.pdf> 
This racial motivation is even more apparent after examining the historical origins of 
felon disenfranchisement laws. For instance, “after Reconstruction, many states expanded their 
restriction on the felon population, which began to contain large proportions of African-
Americans for the first time.”25 Following the Civil War and the emancipation of African-
American slaves, Blacks were given new freedoms, such as the right to vote, during the 
Reconstruction era (1864-1877). One can assume that the threat of African-Americans gaining 
political power during the Reconstruction era motivated states to find new ways to restrict the 
agency of the former slaves. The expansion of felon disenfranchisement laws included restricting 
the vote from individuals convicted of certain crimes. As a result, African-Americans were 
negatively affected by this restriction on voting for certain crimes because these crimes were 
those that “almost exclusively applied against African-Americans.”26 This expansion of felon 
disenfranchisement laws by states in response to large proportions of the African-American 
population is also seen with current laws: “When African-Americans make up a larger 
proportion of a state’s prison population, that state is significantly more likely to adopt or extend 
felon disenfranchisement laws.”27
Due to their disproportionate effect of felon disenfranchisement laws, an overwhelming 
number of African-Americans are prevented from attaining sufficient employment, quality 
education, and safety, which leaves open an array of criminal opportunities. These restrictions 
 Maine and Vermont are the only two states without felon 
disenfranchisement laws, but they also do not have any Black prisoners. Therefore, it seems that 
felon disenfranchisement laws are racially designed to target African-Americans.  
                                                 
25 Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy 55 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 
26 Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 42. 
27 Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 67. 
include “legal restrictions on employment” and “ineligibility of educational benefits” and they 
cause difficulty for ex-offenders to find jobs and a safe place live.28
Felon disenfranchisement laws further prevent highly-valued options for African-
Americans through the restrictions on voting. Voting allows for the decision on factors that 
affect one’s life, thus expanding agency. Voting is an avenue of satisfying the American 
principles of self-preservation, self-sufficiency, freedom, and opportunity. Voters are allowed to 
vote for representatives and policies that would best serve these interests. Therefore, restriction 
on voting causes a prevention of obtaining highly-valued options for felons and even more so for 
African-American felons. This denial of voting is described in Jeff Manza and Christopher 
Uggen’s book Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy when a felon 
described it as throwing salt on an open-wound: “But it’s like it’s still open enough so that you 
 Ineligibility of educational 
benefits prevents equal educational opportunity for felons, thus preventing self-sufficiency and 
long-term self-preservation. Restrictions on employment prevent equal employment 
opportunities, which also prevent long-term self-preservation and self-sufficiency. Difficulty in 
finding a safe place to live shows the lack of safety felons face as well as the abundance of 
criminal options available to them. This array of available criminal opportunities in combination 
with a lack of sufficient employment and education coerces felons to commit further crime. 
Therefore, a repeated felon’s criminal responsibility should be diminished due to his or her 
limited agency caused by felon restrictions and because these laws have a disproportionate effect 
on African-Americans, this limited agency and diminished criminal responsibility are more 
apparent for this group.  
                                                 
28  Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy  (Oxford 
Universty Press 2006) 9. 
telling me that I’m still really bad because I can’t [vote] is like making it sting again.”29
Historical Analysis 
 The 
denial of voting, a basic right as a citizen, informs the felon that he or she is a criminal and unfit 
to perform citizen duties or exercise sufficient agency when determining the options in his or her 
life. It seems then, that as a felon, one can be coerced into further criminal activity due to the 
denial of sufficient options. Therefore, when determining African-Americans’ criminal 
responsibility, legal actors should consider felon restrictions on agency as well as their 
disproportionate effect on African-Americans. 
This chapter shows the role race has played in interpreting the agency of African-
Americans as well as in assigning criminal responsibility and punishment throughout the history 
of the U.S. courts. I will present three cases from three different time periods: Antebellum (1600-
1865) Jim Crow (1865-1965), and Post 1960’s. These time periods capture the variance of racial 
influences on court decisions for African-American defendants. The analysis begins during 
American slavery because this era sparks the beginnings of legal actors interpreting the agency 
of Blacks in America s shown by State v. Caesar (1849). The Jim Crow era shows the transition 
of the role of race in determining the agency of African-Americans as slaves to newly free-
person as exhibited by Johnson v. State (1910). Post-1960’s represents a time when African-
Americans’ criminal status increased greatly due to racialized legislation and discriminatory 
court sentencing such the “War on Drugs” and mandatory sentencing: “The increased rate of 
black imprisonment is a direct and foreseeable consequence of harsher sentencing policies, 
particularly for violent crimes, and of the national ‘war on drugs.’30
                                                 
29 Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy  (Oxford 
Universty Press 2006) 4. 
 Harsher sentencing practices 
for African-Americans during the Post 1960’s era show the importance of the McCleskey v. 
30 See in The Sentencing Project: <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/usvot98o-02.htm> 
Kemp (1987) case. The overarching question this chapter serves to answer is “How has African-
Americans’ criminal agency been interpreted throughout history?” Through these cases, I will 
show how the interpretation of African-Americans’ agency has changed throughout history, 
which is important for determining the necessity of redefining African-Americans’ agency today.  
State v. Caesar (1849) 
Race was a driving force behind American slavery. As explained by the Reverend 
Morgan Godwyn in 1680, “these two words, Negro and Slave, had by custom grown 
Homogeneous and convertible”31 [and] “no one claimed that Southern slavery lacked a 
‘profound racial dimension.’”32 Thus, in determining who would serve as slaves for the New 
World, the consensus held that Black Africans would serve this role: “‘this inquiry into the 
physical, mental, and moral development of the negro race, seems to point them clearly, as 
peculiarly fitted for a laborious class”…[and] “attempts to have servile work done by biological 
equals, namely whites, was a prescription for class conflict and revolution.”33
This consideration of Blacks as sub-human and property was exacerbated when assigning 
criminal punishment to Blacks. A 1669 Virginia slave law, stated that  
 This biological 
attempt to differentiate Blacks from Whites resulted in the belief that Blacks were natural slaves 
and incapable of exhibiting human qualities of conflict and revolution as Whites were. As a 
result, the consideration of Blacks as sub-human and property arose.  
Whereas the only law in force for the punishment of refractory servants resisting 
their master…cannot be inflicted on negroes…if any slave resist his master…and 
by the extremity of the correction should chance to die…the master be acquit 
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32 Morris, Thomas D., Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860 (The University of North Caroline Press 1996) 18. 
33 Morris, Thomas D., Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860 (The University of North Caroline Press 1996) 18. 
from molestation, since it cannot be presumed that malice should induce any man 
to destroy his own estate.”34
The 1669 Virginia slave legislation reinforced the sub-human, property status of Blacks by 
considering them ineligible for legal punishment when other non-Black “refractory servants” 
were subjected to this legal punishment. This was due to Blacks’ perpetual slave status, a societal 
position no other servants experienced because of racial discrimination geared towards Blacks. 
Thus, it did not make any sense for Blacks to be legally punished—such as with the imposition 
of more prison or slave time—because they already served the maximum sentence of forever 
enslaved. Preventing Blacks from legal punishment implied that Blacks were not considered as 
rational acting, human agents capable of legal sanctions. Instead, Blacks were only allowed to be 
punished by their masters. Therefore, at least to legal actors, the agency of Blacks was 
insufficient. In assigning punishment for an act, there is a tacit agreement that agency was 
performed in the act or else holding someone responsible for the act would be futile. In assigning 
criminal agency for Blacks, Virginia on the one hand, refused the sufficiency in their agency and 
deemed them unfit for legal punishment, and on the other, implied that Blacks exercised 
sufficient agency because their masters were allowed to punish them. Therefore, during the 
antebellum period, Virginia was contradictory in its interpretation of Blacks’ agency. This 1669 
Virginia statute leads this chapter into the influence of race on legal actors creating contradictory 
interpretations of Blacks’ agency during the antebellum period.   
  
State v. Caesar (1849)35
                                                 
34 Quoted in Higginbotham, Leon A., Shades of Freedom, (Oxford University Press 1996) 50. 
 represents this contradiction when interpreting Blacks’ agency 
during the antebellum period by demonstrating how the state appointed jury subjected Caesar 
(the Black defendant) to human qualities for the purpose of assigning criminal responsibility, 
35 Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh: 31 N.C. 391 
while also rejecting these human qualities when determining punishment for him. Caesar was a 
Black slave from North Carolina owned by John Latham and Thomas Latham. Caesar was 
convicted of murdering a White man named Kenneth Mizell after hitting him on the head with a 
fence rail. The jury argued that Caesar “not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being 
moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil…feloniously, willfully and of his malice 
aforethought, did make an assault.”36
This conviction of murder was problematic because the juror’s reason for it was in direct 
contradiction to their reason for holding him criminally responsible. The incident began when 
Caesar and his friend Dick, who was also a slave, were lying on the ground in front of a store. 
Mizell (the deceased) and his friend Brickhouse, a White man, walked up to the two slaves 
(Caesar and Dick) and told them that they were patrollers. Brickhouse, with a piece of board, 
 Accusing Caesar of “not having the fear of God before his 
eyes” shows that the State believed that Caesar, although someone’s property and sub-human, 
was capable of human worship and religious principles—but merely neglected to follow them. 
One would not consider a farm animal, which is the property of a farmer, capable of worship and 
religious principles because these are human qualities done with rational thought.  Therefore, in 
this instance, the jury considered Caesar a rational acting human agent who exercised sufficient 
agency in his criminal act. In considering Caesar to be “moved and seduced by the instigation of 
the devil” one could argue that the jury, rather than considering Caesar to be acting with 
sufficient agency, believed his agency was restricted due to the external force of the devil. 
Instead, I argue that by suggesting that Caesar’s actions were done “willfully and of malice and 
aforethought,” the jury actually considered Caesar to be exercising full agency—without any 
restriction—through deliberation and intent to harm. As a result, the jury held Caesar fully 
responsible for his actions and convicted him of murder.  
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began to give the two slaves “two or three slight blows”37 with the board. Brickhouse then began 
a conversation with Caesar and Dick, during which another slave by the name of Charles 
appeared. Brickhouse seized Charles and ordered Dick to retrieve a whip for him so that he 
(Brickhouse) could whip Charles. Dick refused. Due to this refusal, Brickhouse seized Dick. 
Mizell held Dick down while Brickhouse struck him repeatedly in his head and side with his 
fists. While witnessing this beating, Caesar exclaimed that, he “could not stand it”38
The jury’s assigned punishment of the death sentence for Caesar due to his supposed 
inability to exhibit the human quality of passion was in direct contradiction to their assumption 
of Caesar as a rational acting, human agent when they assigned his criminal responsibility.  The 
jury argued that Caesar, unlike a White man, was incapable of acting out of passion because as a 
slave he was used to humiliation. The State argued that: 
 and grabbed 
a fence rail. With the fence rail, Caesar began to hit the two White men out of passion to protect 
his friend. Mizell was hit severely and died the next day. The jury translated Caesar’s assault on 
Mizell as an act of passion. Passion resulted in a conviction of manslaughter (without intent). 
Although Caesar’s act was judged to be one from passion, the jury convicted him of murder 
(with intent) instead of manslaughter because of his Black slave status. This punishment resulted 
in the jury contradicting itself because the punishment of murder meant that Caesar acted 
intentionally, but it was already ruled that he acted out of passion and not willfully. Therefore, 
the jury should have convicted him of manslaughter instead of murder. It was the jury’s 
consideration of Caesar’s race that determined the unfair punishment of the death sentence.  
From the nature of the institution of slavery, a provocation, which, given by one 
white man to another, would excite the passions, and dethrone reason for a time, 
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will not and ought not to produce this effect, when given by a white man to a 
slave. Hence, although, if a white man, receiving a slight blow, kills with a deadly 
weapon, it is but manslaughter; if a slave, for such a blow, should kill a white 
man, it is murder; for, accustomed as he is to constant humiliation, it is not 
calculated to excite to such a degree as to dethrone reason, and must be ascribed 
to a wicked heart, regardless of social duty39
In arguing that Caesar was unaccustomed to humiliation and unable to excite passion due to his 
Black slave status, shows that the jury considered Caesar’s repulsion towards witnessing his 
friend being beaten as out of the norm for a slave. Here, the jury disregarded Caesar’s humanness 
by arguing that he should not have been moved by any passion to kill because he was subhuman 
and as property, he was used to degradation. According to the jury, Caesar should have known 
about this degradation status of his and disregarded any passion that may have arisen within him. 
This shows that if Caesar was a White man, it would have been expected of him to act out of 
passion after witnessing his friend being beaten because a White man is considered human. Due 
to this natural human emotion of passion, the White man’s criminal act would have been 
“extenuated from murder to manslaughter.”
 
40 The jury thought that Caesar, a Black slave, could 
not have acted out of this natural human emotion because he was accustomed to humiliation and 
the only way he could have acted was out of “a wicked heart.”41
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  This thought is contradictory in 
itself. The jury initially applied the human qualities of worship and religious principles to Caesar 
when assessing his agency and assigning him criminal responsibility, but in assigning his 
punishment, the jury disregarded the possibility of him ever having the human quality of passion 
and argued that his act was intentional. Due to Caesar’s Black slave status, the jury’s 
40 Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh: 31 N.C. 391 
41 Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh: 31 N.C. 391 
interpretation of his agency was contradictory. On the one hand, Caesar was considered 
exercising sufficient agency in the criminal act and held fully responsible, and on the other, 
Caesar’s agency was restricted by the jury’s belief of him not being able to exert the human 
quality of passion and punished him as if he intended to kill. Nonetheless, the jury punished him 
to the greatest extent. State v. Caesar (1849) exemplified the common tendency of legal actors in 
the antebellum era to be influenced by racial discrimination that resulted in a contradiction in 
their interpretation of Blacks’ agency, criminal responsibility, and punishment.  
Johnson v. State (1910) 
As in the antebellum period, race in the Jim Crow era played an explicit role when 
determining the criminal agency and responsibility of African-Americans. The influence of race 
provided prosecutors with the ability to disregard facts of a case and rely solely on racist 
assumptions of African-Americans’ when determining their agency and criminal responsibility in 
a crime. According to A. Leon Higginbotham, “counsel have [sic] attacked the credibility of 
African-American defendants and witness [sic] by appealing to stereotypical notions of African-
Americans as either fools or liars.”42
Johnson v. State (1910)
 These stereotypes proved to be highly influential in legal 
actors’ decisions as shown in Johnson v. State (1910).  
43
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 involves an African-American male by the name of Alex 
Johnson who was initially convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol and for his punishment was 
fined $100. Johnson later appealed on the account that the prosecutor made explicit racist 
comments about his character, which he believed influenced the jury’s decision.  The prosecutor 
explicitly mentioned racial stereotypes in order to persuade the jury to convict Johnson:  
43 Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas: 59 Tex. Crim. 11; 127 
The negro race is all alike and about the same the world over--they are untruthful and 
unreliable--they are, as a rule, a set of reprobates and liars, and you can rely upon it that 
when one gets into trouble, as this one has, and you let them sleep over night, they always 
get together and help each other out, and you need not be afraid of doing wrong to 
convict this defendant, for you can look at him and see that he is as guilty as sin.44
In assessing Johnson’s innocence or guilt, the prosecutor did not base his accounts on possible 
factual information, such as his carrying a pistol unlawfully. Instead, the prosecutor only focused 
on Johnson’s race and used this as the sole reason for his conviction.  
  
Derrick Bell attributes the effectiveness of stereotypes in court rooms as segregation-
related paranoia. This term is essential when examining the Jim Crow Era in which Blacks and 
Whites were segregated based on race. Bell’s explains this process as when “each individual 
learns to segregate out of public social interactions…each individual looking at the [perceived 
separate characteristics], with a sense of reality, an association between the segregated group 
[with] dirty, smelly, destructive, and sexual sensations.”45
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 When individuals are separated they 
become strangers to one another and learn to describe the other to negative characteristics in 
order to fully differentiate oneself from the other. Thus, it seems that the negative stereotypes of 
Blacks as portrayed by the prosecutor were convincing to the jury because the jurors were under 
an apartheid state in which the true nature of Blacks were foreign to them and it was easy to 
perceive Johnson as a “liar” as proclaimed by the prosecutor because Blacks were presumed to 
be inferior as reinforced by the segregated society of Jim Crow. Johnson v. State (1910) 
exemplifies the tendency of legal actors during the Jim Crow era to use racial stereotypes when 
45 Bell, Derrick A., Race, Racism, and American Law (Little Brown and Company 1973) 91. 
defining the agency and criminal responsibility of African-Americans as well as the tendency of 
the jury to accept these stereotypes as proof for conviction. 
Derrick Bell categorizes racism into two definitions. The first definition of racism is 
considered overt racism, which is “the use of color per se (or other visible characteristics related 
to color) as a subordinating factor.”46 The second definition of racism is indirect institutional 
subordination because of color, which “is place keeping or keeping of persons in a position or 
status of inferiority by means of attitude, actions, or institutional structures which do not use 
color itself as the subordinating mechanism, but instead use other mechanisms indirectly to 
color.”47
Both Institutional subordination because of color and overt racism can be thought of as 
influential mechanisms in the prosecutor’s defining of Johnson’s agency and criminal 
responsibility. The prosecutor engaged in Institutional Subordination because of Color in 
determining Johnson’s agency and criminal responsibility because he mentioned negative 
stereotypes of Blacks as being a “liar” and “unreliable.” It can be interpreted that Johnson’s 
agency was determined by the prosecutor as sufficient and intentional because in suggesting that 
Johnson was a liar, the prosecutor automatically assumed that Johnson actually committed the 
act even without actual evidence adhering to this assumption. In complying with the prosecutor’s 
stereotypical argument, the jury also engaged in Institutional Subordination because of Color. 
 Overt racism would involve one resorting to someone’s skin color as evidence of their 
inferiority or guilt. Institutional subordination because of color involves larger institutional 
means of subjugating a race based on their color such as through stereotypes used in legal courts. 
These two definitions of racism allow for a better understanding of the role of race in assigning 
criminal agency and responsibility for African-Americans during the Jim Crow era. 
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The prosecutor and jury relied on Johnson’s race to determine his criminal responsibility instead 
of the actual facts of the case.  
The prosecutor’s use of race when interpreting Johnson’s agency and criminal 
responsibility can also be interpreted as overt racism.  When arguing that the jury “need not be 
afraid of doing wrong to convict this defendant, for you can look at him and see that he is as 
guilty as sin,” the prosecutor relied on Johnson’s skin color as evidence of his guilt and so did 
the jury since Jim Crow’s segregation reinforced these stereotypes. Therefore, whether the role 
of race was overt racism or Institutional Subordination because of Color, the decision of 
Johnson’s criminal agency and responsibility shows the influence of his race as an African-
American. 
McClesky v. Kemp (1987) 
Unlike the Antebellum or Jim Crow era, the role of race during the Post-1960’s era in 
determining Blacks’ agency and criminal responsibility was implicit rather than explicit while its 
impact on African-Americans’ punishment was highly apparent.48 The Post-1960’s era 
represented a high increase in incarceration49 and a greater favor to the death penalty by the 
public.50
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 Out of this culture of high incarceration rates and greater interest in the death penalty 
bore the landmark case McCleskey v. Kemp (1987). Warren McCleskey was an African-
American man convicted of murder and issued a punishment of the death penalty by the Superior 
Court of Fulton County, Georgia. The Georgia law at the time allowed the jury to impose the 
death penalty for murder if at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances existed beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The jury found that two out of the total ten aggravating circumstances had 
49 Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 97. 
50 Friedman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in American History (Harper Collins Publishers 1993) 318. 
existed beyond a reasonable doubt in McCleskey’s act of murder. This included committing 
murder during the course of an armed robbery and committing an offense against a police officer 
“engaged in the performance of his duties”.51
The jury’s perception of McCleskey’s blackness influenced their decision not to consider 
any mitigating factors that would have shown a limitation of his agency, thus limiting his 
criminal responsibility and punishment. In his book, Race, Racism, and American Law Derrick 
Bell argues that “it would require a miracle to effectively screen from the jury room all of the 
beliefs based on racial myths and fears that social scientists have found permeate society...[and 
that] racial considerations do influence jury decisions”
 The jury found no mitigating factors and took these 
aggravating circumstances into account in deciding the death penalty for McCleskey.  It seems 
then that due to McCleskey’s violation of the relevant aggravating circumstances, the jury’s 
account of his agency was that it was enough to assign him sufficient responsibility and as a 
result, he was given the death penalty. On the surface, race seemed to not have any influencing 
role on the jury’s interpretation of McCleskey’s agency, but a closer examination will reveal that 
this is not the case. 
52
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 In arguing that eliminating racism from 
courtrooms would require a “miracle,” suggests that the influence of race on juror’s decisions are 
still active today due to the historical effects of racism that has been ingrained in the American 
psyche. One study called “The American Jury at 341,” which was conducted in the mid-1950’s 
and included 225 jurors, involved heavy racial influences on juror’s perception of Blacks’ 
agency and ultimately their decision to punish Blacks more harshly. For instance, one juror 
reported: “Niggers have to be taught how to behave. I feel that if he hadn’t done that, he’d done 
something else probably even worse and that he should be put out of the way for a good long 
52 Bell, Derrick A., Race, Racism, and American Law (Little Brown and Company 1973) 949. 
while.”53 In referring to Blacks as “niggers,” and admitting that “if he [the Black defendant] 
hadn’t done that, he’d done something else probably even worse” shows that this juror based his 
decision on race, which included a possible hatred towards Blacks as well as the belief that 
Blacks are inherently violent and deserving of harsh or cruel and unusual punishment.  Although 
this study was conducted in the mid-1950’s racism has permeated through American society and 
is often reinforced. Derrick Bell explains that the perception of racism persists and is reinforced 
when one “selectively focuses upon content which supports one’s own beliefs and by selectively 
ignoring content which undermines them.”54
Furthermore, the evidence of the disparate racial impact of the death penalty as presented 
by the 1970’s Baldus study
 The selection of what one chooses to believe and 
ignore highlights the racial intent of jury’s decision of Blacks’ agency, criminal responsibility, 
and punishment.  Therefore, in regards to McCleskey, I argue that the persistence of American 
racism had most likely influenced  the jury’s interpretation history of American racism 
influenced the jury’s interpretation of McCleskey’s agency in order to reinforce the racial belief 
Blacks being inherently violent while disregarding any mitigating factors that could contradict 
this belief. As a result, the role of race in interpreting the agency of McCleskey was probably 
done with a subtle intent by the jury to satisfy their long-held racial beliefs of Blacks. 
55
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 shows that the role of race in assigning criminal responsibility and 
punishment for McCleskey created explicit disparate effects. This disparate racial impact has 
been shown in other instances such as with employment bars on individuals with criminal 
records where in some states, the courts have ruled against them arguing these bars have a 
“disparate impact on African-Americans” as shown in Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad 
54 Bell, Derrick A., Race, Racism, and American Law (Little Brown and Company 1973) 90. 
55 Baldus Study quoted in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): 481 U.S. 279 
Company (1975).56 The 1970’s Baldus study demonstrated a disparity between Whites and 
African-Americans in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia. The study showed that 
11% of the defendants charged with killing a White person received the death penalty and only 
1% of defendants charged with killing African-Americans received the death penalty. The study 
also revealed that in Georgia, 22% of the death penalty cases involved African-American 
defendants and White victims versus 3% of the cases involving White defendants and African-
American victims. Furthermore, 8% of the cases involved White defendants and White victims 
while 1% of the cases involved African-American defendants and African-American victims.57
Justice Powell, as deliverer of the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp 
(1987), argued that at most the Baldus study indicated “a discrepancy that appears to correlate 
with race.”
 
This racial discrimination in this study suggests that White lives are more valuable than Blacks’ 
lives and therefore the assigning of Blacks the death penalty seems to be racially motivated. 
McCleskey appealed to the Supreme Court and presented this statistical evidence in order to 
show that his conviction of the death penalty involved racial influence as shown by the obvious 
disparate impact of the death penalty between Blacks and Whites in Georgia. The Supreme Court 
disregarded this study as evidence of any influence of race in deciding McCleskey’s criminal 
responsibility and punishment, thus upholding the original decision.  
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  The huge disparities that existed such as when the defendant is Black and the 
victim is White (the Black defendant is charged with the death penalty 22% of the time) or when 
the defendant is White and the victim is Black (the White defendant is only charged with the 
death penalty 3% of the time) show more than an appearance of correlation.  I would argue that 
57 Baldus Study quoted in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): 481 U.S. 279 
58 Justice Powell’s opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): 481 U.S. 279 
if race only appeared to correlate with the sentencing of the death penalty, then the 
disproportionate death sentencing for African-Americans would not be so large. These numbers 
are too stark to be merely a coincidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court should have recognized 
the disparate impact of Georgia’s death penalty on Blacks as enough reason to rule against it as 
the Court did in Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (1975).  
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision to ignore the Baldus study as evidence for race as 
an influential factor in determining McCleskey’s criminal responsibility and punishment, it can 
be interpreted that the Court thought factors other than race played a more dominant role in 
assigning criminal responsibility and punishment for McCleskey. The Court argued that it was 
“unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal, because legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the 
decision is apparent from the record: McCleskey committed an act for which the United States 
Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty”.59 Here, the Court 
reaffirmed the decision that race did not have a role in assigning criminal responsibility and 
punishment for McCleskey. Instead, Justice Powell argued that McCleskey’s actions themselves 
caused his committal to the death penalty. This argument would seem plausible if the jury 
considered possible mitigating factors for McCleskey and found that there were none, but they 
never considered any. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976) it was announced that “after the defendant 
was convicted of a capital crime, the judge had to consider any mitigating and aggravating 
evidence. This case resulted in the requirement of the Supreme Court of Georgia to review all 
death cases to see whether ‘passion or prejudice’…had influenced the sentence or whether the 
sentence was ‘excessive or disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases.”60
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 Gregg v. Georgia 
set precedence for the requirement of considering mitigating factors in death penalty cases in 
60 Friedman, Lawrence M., Crime and Punishment in American History (Harper Collins Publishers 1993) 318. 
Georgia as well as requiring further review by the Georgia Court in order to prevent any negative 
perceptions or prejudices in influencing the decision of the jury. However, the jury’s decision in 
McCleskey’s death sentence violated this rule because it was “disproportionate to the penalty in 
similar cases” since White men—as seen in the Baldus study— who also committed murder 
were often not sentenced to death as Black men were. The Superior Court of Fulton County, 
Georgia made the mistake of agreeing with the jury’s opinion without further review of the 
disparate racial impact that created a discrepancy in who would receive a death sentence. One 
cannot consider the facts of the Baldus study as race-neutral because the disparities in the death 
sentencing between Blacks and Whites were so great, thus highly suggesting heavy racial 
influence in the decisions of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment for McCleskey. 
Although there are other considerations in play when assigning the death penalty as seen 
in the McCleskey case (the murder of a police officer combined with armed robbery), it was the 
jury’s discretion in deciding whether or not to consider mitigating factors that would have 
lessened the punishment of McCleskey.  The history of racism has been ingrained in the minds 
of Americans since slavery and has had a huge effect on the jury’s perception of African-
American defendants:  “‘Americans share a historical experience that has resulted in individuals 
within the culture ubiquitously attaching a significance to race that is irrational and often outside 
of their awareness.”’61
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 Racial discrimination is often-times conducted without reason or 
unconsciously. Even if a juror denies any racial influence in his or her decision, the racism in 
America’s history shows that one’s race cannot be ignored. The statistical evidence of the racial 
discrimination in Georgia’s death sentencing practices during the 1970’s by the Baldus study 
gave further evidence that a disparate racial impact can be translated into a racial intent to 
 
criminalize Blacks more harshly. Therefore, after taking a glance at the historical effects of racial 
disparities and inequities, it is permissible to acknowledge that race played both a subtle role of 
intention when determining the agency of Warren McCleskey and an explicit role in assigning 
his criminal responsibility and punishment. 
Through the analysis of three historical cases, which covered very important eras in 
African-Americans’ criminal history, I have shown how the role of race in determining the 
agency and criminal responsibility for African-Americans has varied throughout time. The 
influence of race on these decisions went from being explicitly mentioned during the Antebellum 
and Jim Crow era to implicitly shown through disparate racial impact during the Post-1960’s era. 
This variance in the racial influence on legal interpretations of African-Americans’ agency and 
criminal responsibility shows the changes in how African-American’s criminality have been 
interpreted while at the same time representing a consistency in having a unique interpretation 
for African-American defendants based on their race. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge 
this consistency when examining current court cases in order to fully analyze the role that race 
plays for today’s African-Americans.  
Application  
As shown, felon laws are very coercive in their effects on crime probability due to their 
restrictions on highly-valued options--employment, education, and safety—which are necessary 
for attaining long-term self-preservation and self-sufficiency. African-Americans are convicted 
and imprisoned at a higher rate than any other racial group and as a result, African-Americans 
are disproportionately represented as felons. In fact, felon laws have their roots in racial politics. 
As discussed in my agency chapter, after the Reconstruction era felon laws were expanded to 
include former slaves and this lead to their rapid imprisonment. This racial intent of felon laws is 
currently seen by states’ tendencies to expand their felon laws as their Black population 
increases. Due to their coercive effect on people’s ability to commit crime, I argue that felon 
laws limit the agency of those affected by them. This limitation in agency is shown by the 
restriction in employment, voting, and educational opportunities. These restrictions also limit the 
mobility of the felon, leaving him or her trapped in the same environment that lack highly-valued 
options--thus fueling the criminal cycle. The coupling of race and a felon record for African-
Americans makes highly-valued options virtually impossible for this group. Devah Pager 
describes this “double-jeopardy” effect in his Milwaukee study of race, crime, and employment: 
“hundreds of thousands of young black men released from prison each year, [are] facing bleak 
employment prospects as a result of their race and criminal record.”62
I will analyze this case in order to apply my definition of agency. Using my definition of 
agency, I will offer a normative critique of the case. The record of this case is limited in that the 
defendant’s exact location or race is unknown. Thus, I will use speculation in order to conclude 
the effects of his criminal status based on these uncertain factors. Unlike the historical analysis of 
this thesis, the influence of race as a motivating factor behind the conviction of African-
American defendants will not be focused. Instead, this chapter will focus on the specific effects 
of felon laws on the agency of the defendant, who is a three-time repeated felon.  
 This chapter will further 
analyze these felony restrictions on African-Americans’ agency through an analysis of a recent 
court case involving a repeated felon offender: Washington v. Poole (2007). 
Washington v. Poole (2007) 
William Washington was convicted on October 31, 2002 for grand larceny in the fourth 
degree, a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30(5), for stealing William Carelis’s wallet. 
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According to the N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30(5), grand larceny in the fourth degree is “the 
property, regardless of its nature and value, is taken from the person of another.”63 During the 
time of the incident, Carelis “recalled feeling someone ‘brush against’ the left pocket of his pants 
as he was walking… discovered that his wallet, which contained $90, was missing, and he 
noticed [Washington] in the vicinity.”64 According to Carelis, he said to [Washington], “‘stop . . 
. you have my wallet,’ but [Washington] kept walking [and Carelis] followed the [Washington] 
down the stairs, but stumbled, and he yelled, ‘Hey, stop that guy, he's got my wallet.’”65 It is 
during this time when witness Abdoulaye Sakho chased after Washington and grabbed him. 
Washington then threw the wallet towards Carelis, exclaiming that “he ‘found’ the wallet.”66
Grand larceny in the fourth degree normally amounts to a maximum of two to four years 
in prison, but this was Washington’s third felony offense. This meant that Washington would be 
sentenced based on New York’s Persistent Felony Offender statute: N.Y. Penal Law § 70.10. 
This statute states that “a persistent felony offender is a person, other than a persistent violent 
felony offender as defined in section 70.08, who stands convicted of a felony after having 
 
Washington’s defense council argued that there was no evidence that Washington had used 
physical force and suggested that it was a possibility that the wallet fell out of Carelis’s wallet 
and all Washington did was merely pick it up. This defense was rejected by the Court because 
the judge argued that this suggestion was speculation due to a lack of evidence and Washington 
did not present any witnesses to attest to this. As a result, the Court was convinced that 
Washington had unlawfully taken Carelis’s wallet and convicted him of grand larceny in the 
fourth degree.  
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previously been convicted of two or more felonies.”67 This statute gave the Court the liberty to 
use Washington’s history and character as well as the nature and circumstances of his crime to 
determine whether or not an “extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the 
public interest.”68 This statute results in a minimum of fifteen to twenty-five years and a 
maximum of life imprisonment. As a result, Washington was sentenced to twenty years in 
prison. The court explained that it “relied on the extensive number of his prior convictions, the 
fact that he repeated the same sorts of theft crimes at the same location, and the court's 
conclusion that he was beyond rehabilitation and would continue to steal ‘as long as he is 
physically able.’”69 The Court’s decision was based on Washington’s twelve theft related 
misdemeanor convictions in New York City, three other theft related felony convictions between 
1990 and 1999 in New York City, and fifty-seven arrests outside of New York in various states. 
The Court stated that once Washington is released from “committing one crime, he seems to go 
right back and commit another crime and is brought back to jail… This is someone who is not 
going to stop committing crimes.”70
Washington appealed to the Supreme Court of New York’s Appellate Division arguing 
that his twenty-year sentence was unconstitutional. He argued that the original court-in having 
the sole discretion of determining his sentencing based on his history, character, and nature of 
crime-violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Washington was referencing Blakely v. 
Washington (2004), which “made it clear that any factor that increases a sentence for an offender 
 It is for these reasons that Washington was sentenced to 
twenty-years in prison for stealing a wallet with ninety-dollars inside, which otherwise would 
have led to a maximum of two years.  
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past the statutory maximum…must be found by a jury.”71 The New York Persistent Felony 
Offender statute was the factor that increased Washington’s grand larceny sentence from a 
maximum of two to four years to a minimum of fifteen years to life imprisonment; the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington (2004) prevented this from happening unless it 
was by a jury’s decision. In reviewing Washington’s case, the Supreme Court of New York 
upheld the New York Persistent Felony statute, but modified his sentence from twenty to fifteen 
years because it was considered excessive. This meant that the Court upheld the judge’s sole 
discretion in examining Washington’s history and character as well as the nature and 
circumstances of his theft. The Court argued that the Persistent Felony statute “merely serves to 
aid the Appellate Division's judicial review of sentences for undue harshness in the interest of 
justice.”72 In other words, a jury’s ruling was deemed unnecessary. No other facts such as 
Washington’s environmental history were considered. In its justification, the Court further 
argued that “Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a 
construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the state."73
Washington further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which 
argued in his favor. In March 2010, the Second Circuit stated that “we hold that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, applicable to the states as incorporated by the fourteenth 
amendment, prohibits the type of judicial fact-finding resulting in enhanced sentences under 
 
Thus, New York’s highest court rejected the Supreme Court ruling in Blakely v. Washington 
(2004). 
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New York’s Persistent Felony Offender statute.”74 The Second Circuit then sent Washington’s 
case back to lower federal courts for “determination of whether state court rulings upholding 
[Washington’s] enhanced sentences were harmless error or whether their release should be 
ordered.”75 If it is found that the sentencing was “harmless error” then Washington’s sentence 
would be approved.76
In Washington’s original conviction, the Court disregarded the lack of highly-valued 
options in his environment as a possible limitation in his agency and criminal responsibility. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court argued that in his original conviction, 
William Washington’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury was violated, but the 
violation of these Constitutional Amendments were not the only factors neglected by this court. 
The New York Persistent Felony statute gives judges the liberty to examine a defendant’s history 
as well as the nature and circumstances of the crime. Although the judge examined Washington’s 
criminal history, the judge neglected to examine his environmental history, which includes the 
availability of employment and educational options as well as the abundance of criminal options 
or the lack thereof. These factors are necessary when examining one’s ability to make desirable 
choices towards long-term self-preservation and self-sufficiency. As mentioned, the New York 
Court’s decision in Washington’s original conviction was based on the “fact that he repeated the 
same sort of theft crimes at the same location.” This repeat at the same location may demonstrate 
not a simple desire to be a criminal, but the lack of highly-valued options in Washington’s 
environment. It seems that after his incarceration, Washington was placed in the same restrictive 
 This case is still pending.  
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environment that caused him to commit theft in the first place. This restrictive environment 
suggests that criminal opportunity was readily available and rehabilitation assistance—such as 
education and employment—were not.   
As President George W. Bush stated in his 2004 State of the Union address, “we know 
from long experience that if they [ex-cons] can’t find work, or a home, or help, they are much 
more likely to commit crime and return to prison.”77 President Bush’s message exemplifies the 
necessity of rehabilitation programs in an ex-offender’s environment in order to prevent a repeat 
in criminal activity. An example of this positive rehabilitation effect on reducing crime is shown 
by Newark’s Nicholson Foundation, which has a program that helps parolees receive basic 
necessities such as food, housing, and mental health counseling. Without this assistance, 
Newark’s ex-prisoners would not have access to these basic necessities. This access would help 
to prevent them from being coerced to commit further crime in order to fulfill these basic 
necessities. It becomes even more important to provide rehabilitation services in areas such as 
Newark because “more than 95 percent of those incarcerated [are] eventually released.”78 This 
huge number of released ex-offenders makes the necessity for sufficient rehabilitation services in 
ex-offenders’ environments even more pressing.  As Newark’s deputy mayor for economic 
development Stefan Pryor stated, “The last thing a returning ex-offender needs is to have to 
chase down a dozen different services to remedy their problems.”79
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 In other words, without the 
presence of rehabilitation services in an ex-offender’s environment that could provide long-term 
self-preservation and self-sufficiency, the outcome could be problematic and the act of 
78 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration  (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 2. 
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<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/nyregion/27excons.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=seeking%20the%20key
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committing crime would continue. Newark also has a mechanics training school specifically for 
ex-offenders with felony records and “90 percent of the graduates find jobs and stay out of 
jail.”80
Some may argue that rehabilitation services are not enough to prevent one from 
committing further crime. This was the case in Newark, New Jersey with Ronald O’Reily, a 
forty-one year old ex-convict who spent most of his life in prison for burglary, drug sales and 
weapons possession. He was offered a furnished apartment to live in as well as a job to help 
build and renovate apartments. According to the 2008 New York Times Article “Seeking the 
Key to Employment for Ex-Cons,” within five months, O’Reilly “had rekindled his love affair 
with crack cocaine…He stopped coming to work, ceased paying his $500 monthly rent, and by 
the time he was evicted, had not only sold off the contents of the apartment, but also the items in 
an adjacent storage space that belonged to his erstwhile patron… He was arrested soon after and 
charged with sexual assault.”
 Newark has shown that rehabilitation services for ex-offenders serve as highly-valued 
options for them. As shown by the 90% graduation rate, these services are highly-valued by 
participating ex-offenders. Thus, when an ex-offender’s environment is revamped to include 
highly-valued options that were once restricted to him or her, crime then becomes the 
undesirable option that s/he refrains from. Therefore, I argue that Washington’s repeat of the 
same crime at the same location may have been due to a lack of rehabilitation services in his 
environment. These services, if available, could have prevented Washington from committing 
further theft crimes.  
81
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 The case of O’Reily shows how rehabilitation services such as 
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employment and housing are sometimes unable to prevent an ex-con from committing further 
crime. This may have been the case with Washington as well. In this case, one could argue that 
Washington’s agency was not limited because rehabilitation services may have been available to 
him. Although this could be true, this argument fails to consider other agency limiting factors 
that can cause Washington to commit further in the face of highly-valued options such as 
rehabilitation services. These factors include a lack of rehabilitation while in prison, a 
development of a habit, and old age.  
The prison system is seen as more of a punitive solution to crime rather than as a means 
for rehabilitation. This lack of rehabilitation has been shown to be ineffective and destructive. As 
a 1967 report published by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice stated, “the conditions in which [prisoners] live are the poorest possible preparation for 
their successful reentry to society, and often reinforces in them a pattern of manipulation or 
destructiveness.”82 This study recognized that without successful rehabilitation inside of prisons, 
the prisoner would leave with either the same criminal tendencies as before or worse. In other 
words, the penal system is ineffective and contributes to the re-arrests seen among many ex-cons. 
This fact was noted in a 1973 report by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals: “institutions create crime rather than prevent it.”83
                                                 
82 As quoted in Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration, (The 
University of Chicago Press 2007) 1. 
 The claim that 
institutions create crime is a strong accusation of America’s penal system, which highlights both 
this system’s inability to prevent crime and its role as a crime incubator. This fact could be 
attributed to Washington’s case who was not a stranger to this system as a three-time repeated 
felon with an “extensive number of prior convictions.” As it has been shown, when a prisoner is 
83 As quoted in Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration, (The 
University of Chicago Press 2007) 5. 
incarcerated, he or she is not given assistance such as counseling, education or job training that 
would serve to prevent further crime. Instead, one receives retribution. The focus on retribution 
rather than rehabilitation means that Washington’s time in prison lacked highly-valued options, 
which he could have used as a proper means for reintegration into the broader society. Therefore, 
even if Washington’s environment outside of prison consisted of rehabilitation services, the 
failure to provide these services while he was in prison may have conditioned him to be a 
permanent criminal incapable of being rehabilitated by services outside of prison. This results in 
a restriction of his criminal agency in further committed crimes.  
Habit could also explain a repeat of crime even in the midst of available rehabilitation 
services in his environment. In Washington’s original conviction, the judge recognized that 
Washington is “someone who is not going to stop committing crimes.” It seems then that as 
someone who constantly repeats the same crime, has made it out of a habit. Instead of viewing 
this habit of thieving as an inherent criminality that deserves long-term imprisonment, one 
should consider other possible origins of this habit. As I argued previously, Washington’s repeat 
of the same crime at the same location could represent a lack of highly valued options in his 
environment. It could have been that each time Washington was convicted of theft, he was sent 
back to his same restricted environment with the opportunity to commit it again. This restricted 
environment, coupled with the penal system’s lack of rehabilitation services and its tendency to 
foster crime, most likely limited Washington’s agency in choosing a life without crime. After 
being used to the same restrictive environments for so long, Washington may have become used 
to stealing goods in order to fulfill the necessity of long-term self-preservation. Getting used to 
crime or creating a habit out of it could result in one’s inability to be rehabilitated. The judge 
seems aware of this possibility when s/he concludes that Washington was “beyond rehabilitation 
and would continue to steal as long as he is physically able.” Instead of viewing this habit as a 
reason for further punishment, the judge should have recognized that Washington’s possible 
history of restricted environments—both in and outside of prison—may have coerced 
Washington into a life of crime and he could not have fathomed life without it. In other words, a 
habit in committing crime represents a restriction in one’s agency, and one’s disregard for 
available rehabilitation services shows the magnitude of this habit.  
In addition, Washington’s age could explain his repeat in crime even when there may 
have been rehabilitation services within his environment. Washington was sixty-three years old84 
when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that his conviction under the New York 
Persistent Felony statute was unconstitutional. This fact would have made Washington sixty-
years old during his original conviction in 2007. Washington’s age is very significant in 
analyzing his possible agency during the time of the crime. As someone who is approaching 
retirement age,85 Washington’s job prospects are slim, especially for a senior felon. Pager 
recognizes the difficulty in senior felons refraining from further crime due to limited 
employment opportunities: “weakened ties to family and work associated with long spells of 
incarceration may themselves stimulate continued offending.”86
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  Washington’s ability to obtain 
sufficient employment may have been extremely limited due to his old age and long-time prison 
history. As a result, his ability to refrain from constant theft would have been extremely limited 
as well. Washington would not have been able to hold steady employment nor would he have 
been able to obtain necessary employable skills. Therefore, Washington’s old age is a possible 
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factor in his repeat of theft even when rehabilitation services may have been available to him. 
The Court should have considered Washington’s age as a limiting agency factor in his constant 
repeat of theft when determining his criminal responsibility.  
As shown, rehabilitation services in an ex-offender’s environment are not always able to 
prevent him or her from committing further crime, but for the most part these services have been 
shown to greatly reduce crime; a fact that becomes obsolete for many African-Americans due to 
the location variance of these services. Rehabilitation services vary depending on location, which 
causes a discrepancy in the services received between minorities and White ex-offenders. The 
organization Drug Policy found that “White first offenders received rehabilitative placements in 
the community at twice the rate of blacks or Latinos.”87
In his book, Marked, Devah Pager describes this coercive effect of committing further 
crimes by an ex-prisoner due to a lack of highly-valued options: “scholarly literature in 
criminology indicates that ex-offenders who are unable to find legal work face increasing 
 This discrepancy leaves African-
American ex-offenders more vulnerable to recidivism. In other words, African-Americans’ 
environments are less likely to include highly-valued options that would minimize criminal 
opportunity. Although Washington was not a first-time offender at the time of his original 
conviction and his race is unknown, the fact that there is a racial discrepancy in available 
rehabilitation services, shows that if he were African-American, his chances at receiving 
rehabilitation services after incarceration are very limited. This could also explain Washington’s 
repeat of the same theft crime at the same location; without the presence of rehabilitation 
services, Washington’s chances at obtaining highly-valued options were restricted. This may 
have lead to a restriction in Washington’s agency and should have therefore, been considered as 
such when the judge assigned his criminal responsibility and punishment.  
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incentives to return to crime…a criminal record may itself reduce opportunities for finding 
legitimate work.”88
Parolees with drug convictions do not qualify for federal tuition grants and 
outstanding traffic fines prevent many from obtaining driver’s license [sic] that 
would give them access to jobs beyond the city’s public transit system and 
because child support payments and court fees accrue while they are behind bars, 
the pay-checks of newly employed offenders are sometimes heavily garnished
  Ex-offenders often find difficulty in gaining employment due to their 
criminal record and without the highly-valued option of employment, he or she find incentives to 
return to crime. The article “Seeking the Key to Employment for Ex-Cons” also vividly 
explains this dire situation in which ex-prisoners struggle at obtaining highly-valued options as 
they exit prison and becomes re-integrated into the same restrictive environment they derived 
from:  
89
This article shows that in Newark, New Jersey, highly-valued options such as quality education, 
sufficient employment, and minimal criminal opportunity are almost non-existent for ex-
prisoners. There exist many barriers to achieving highly-valued options for felons, including 
transportation, education, and employment barriers. According to Devah Pager’s Milwaukee 
study of felons and employment, ex-offenders have a higher chance at being employed in the 
suburbs than the city,
  
90
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 but when one is prevented from this locale with higher availability of 
employment due to transportation barriers, their freedom to obtain such employment is restricted. 
When an ex-offender is faced with barriers to education, s/he is limited in his or her job 
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prospects and often-times ends up with an insufficient employment that garner’s his or her entire 
paycheck due to built up fines that were out of one’s control while incarcerated. Even if these 
barriers are not enough for one to commit further crime, the transportation barrier to employment 
will certainly leave one without the means to stay employed. According to the article “Seeking 
the Key to Employment for Ex-Cons,” Newark’s unemployment rate is twice that of the state 
average with 16% of adults possessing a criminal record and as the article describes: “The 
situation epitomizes the way Newark’s two leading problems, crime and unemployment, are 
intertwined with the huge number of ex-convicts in the city.91 There is a positive correlation 
between unemployment and crime rates. Without highly-valued options such as sufficient 
employment, crime initially becomes an attractive means for survival and later becomes an 
overwhelming option for those residing within this environment. As Pager noted, “incarceration 
is associated with limited future employment opportunities and earnings potential, which 
themselves are among the strongest predictors of desistance from crime.”92
The lack of highly-valued options is the reason behind many re-arrests. This relationship 
between highly-valued options and re-arrests is highly apparent in Newark, New Jersey where 
there exists a high unemployment rate with re-arrests rates up to 65% within five years out of 
 It seems then that in 
order to achieve long-term self-preservation and self-sufficiency, Washington may have been 
coerced into committing the same crime due to his felon status, which restricted employment 
opportunities and as a result crime served as an alternative to this missing highly-valued option. 
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prison.93 Many times ex-offenders are rearrested for the same crimes as demonstrated in a 1985 
article from the U.S. Department of Justice titled “Probation and Felony Offenders”: “With the 
exception of drug offenders, [California’s] probationers were most often arrested and convicted 
of the same crimes they had been originally been convicted of.”94 This particular study shows 
that re-arrest rates are even more apparent with felony offenders as seen in William 
Washington’s case who, as a felon, was convicted of “seventy similar thefts.”95
Washington’s repeat of the same crime at the same location not only shows a possible 
lack of highly-valued options, but also the restrictions placed on felons. In many cases, the 
option to travel outside a restrictive environment (one that lacks highly-valued options) is 
virtually impossible for ex-offenders. This was seen in Newark, New Jersey where felons who 
were prevented from obtaining a driver’s license could not travel to available employment 
because it existed outside of the city and public transportation to these areas was unavailable. 
Felons are often-times “stuck” in environments that lack sufficient employment due to 
transportation barriers. Furthermore, educational attainment is virtually impossible for drug 
 When the Court 
examined the nature and circumstances of Washington’s theft, they should have considered the 
possible the circumstance of his environment lacking sufficient employment as well as the 
possibility of the nature of his theft being a viable means for self-preservation. In other words, 
the nature and circumstances of Washington’s crime may have limited his criminal agency and 
as a result, limited his criminal responsibility. Washington’s conviction should have 
acknowledged this notion.  
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offenders since they are restricted from financial aid and other educational privileges. These 
restrictions can coerce a felon to commit further crime in order to attain the necessary values of 
long-tem self-preservation and self-sufficiency. This coercion creates a limitation of one’s 
agency. Washington’s could have environment restricted his agency, but the mere fact that he 
was a felon highlights this restriction even more. Even if Washington’s environment consisted of 
these highly-valued options, he was barred from these available options because of his felon 
status.  
The effects of a felon status on one’s agency also vary by race such that African-
Americans’ agency becomes more restricted than their White counterparts. In his book Marked, 
Devah Pager describes a negative credential as an “official marker that restricts access and 
opportunity rather than enabling them.”96 He argues that a criminal record is the “archetypal” 
negative credential as a “wide range of social, economic, and political privileges become off-
limits.”97 Thus, a felony’s negative credential restricts the agency of felons because it restricts 
opportunities and access to goods necessary for self-preservation. Felons are restricted from 
having access to necessary goods such voting, higher-education, and even from some of the most 
basic low-wage occupations such as barber, plumber, and billiard room employee.98  Many of 
these restricted employments are those that African-Americans heavily occupy: the public sector 
and low-wage medical jobs.99
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 Therefore, if Washington is an African-American, he is restricted 
from achieving self-preservation in its most basic form. As a result, crime may have resulted in 
being the next viable option. 
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In examining the racial influence on a felon’s job prospects, Pager found a “strong 
aversion to both blacks and ex-offenders, and an even stronger aversion towards applicants 
bearing both characteristics…the combination of minority status and criminal record results in 
almost total exclusion from this labor market.”100 If this fact is factored into Washington’s case, 
it becomes evident that as an African-American, Washington’s ability to refrain from crime may 
have been heavily curtailed and therefore his determine criminal responsibility by the Court 
should have reflected this.  This could explain his extensive criminal history of “seventy similar 
thefts” since theft is a way to provide self-preservation through economic gain. Pager’s study 
involved an examination of both Black and White felons with the same credentials: criminal 
record, employment competency, and educational level. In other words, the participants were 
identical except for a difference in race. Even with these similarities, Pager explains that a White 
felon has a higher percentage of gaining employment than a Black felon-especially when there 
was personal contact involved: White felons without personal contact received callbacks from 
employers 9% of the time versus 4% for Blacks, and White felons who did have personal contact 
with employers received callbacks 42% of the time versus 6% callbacks for Black felons with 
this same personal contact. 101
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 A personal contact allows the employer to get to know the 
employee beyond what is written on the application. Here, the felon has some opportunity to 
persuade the employer to hire him or her even with a criminal record. As this study reveals, 
African-Americans are at an extreme disadvantage when attempting to convince employers to 
hire them as shown by the small percentage difference between personal contacts and none at all 
for this group. Therefore, race heavily influence how one could exercise his or her agency.  
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Pager also describes a difference in employment for Black and White felons depending 
on location such as in the suburbs versus the inner-city. White felons had a 7% callback rate in 
the inner-city versus 6% for Blacks, and White felons within the suburbs had a 22% callback rate 
versus 3% for Blacks.102  This study shows that Black felons fare worse in obtaining 
employment in the suburbs than in the city and in comparison to Whites, their employment 
prospects were even more insignificant. This inner-city versus suburb comparison is important 
because as seen previously with felons in Newark, much of the available employment is outside 
of the inner-city. In this Milwaukee study, Pager shows that “more than 90 percent of recent job 
growth was in the outlying areas, compared to only 4 percent of new jobs in the central city of 
Milwaukee.”103African-Americans are disproportionately represented in inner-cities and are 
therefore disproportionately affected by unemployment. This low percentage in the suburban 
employment rate for African-Americans can also be attributed to transportation barriers as 
witnessed in the Newark case study. Even when African-Americans were hired in employment 
outside the inner-city, they were often-times prevented from staying employed due to heavy 
traffic fines that prevented them from driving a car as well as an unreliable or non-existent public 
transportation systems.104
                                                 
102 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 110-111. 
 Considering the fact that Washington was convicted of “twelve theft 
related misdemeanors in New York City… [and] three other theft related felony convictions in 
New York City” shows that employment which would have been sufficient for Washington to 
stop committing theft may have been unavailable to him since New York City is an inner-city 
103 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 107. 
104 Note: the results of Devah Pager’s Milwaukee study show “a best case scenario in portraying the views of 
employers in other metropolitan areas (Marked, 120). Milwaukee was actually considered more tolerant and open in 
its hiring of ex-offenders than employers in cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. In other words, for 
African-American felons in other cities’ the chances at getting employed are even more lower than they are in 
Milwaukee. 
and as shown, there is a higher chance for one to receive employment outside of the inner-city. 
Instead of examining Washington’s perpetual theft crimes as an inherent tendency to be a 
criminal, the Court should have examined his criminal history in light of his potential restricted 
environmental history as a Black, inner-city felon. Washington’s environmental history—which 
included possible racial discrimination and a lack of highly-valued options—could  have 
translated into a limitation of both his agency and criminal responsibility. Therefore, 
Washington’s punishment should have reflected this restriction. 
Conclusion 
The American criminal justice system has expanded since the 1970s. The prison 
population was 100 inmates per 100,000 residents for most of the twentieth century until it 
doubled between 1972 and 1984, and then increased to 486 per 100,000 residents in 2004.105 
Currently seven million people are under criminal justice supervision and “tough on crime” 
policies are responsible for this rapid expansion. 106 Before these policies emerged during the 
1950’s and 1960’s, the criminal justice system focused more on rehabilitation than retribution: 
“it was widely believed that counseling, education, and job training were central to criminal 
desistance and that active intervention could have lasting effects.”107
                                                 
105 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 11. 
 Counseling, education, and 
job training are important rehabilitative methods for ensuring a smooth transition into the 
broader society. These methods equip an ex-offender with essential skills needed to gain 
competency in areas such as the work force. As shown previously in William Washington’s case, 
the lack of sufficient employment is the major cause for re-arrests among ex-offenders. Although 
106 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 11.  
107 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 15.  
it has been shown that rehabilitation services have been proven to be effective at preventing 
further crime, the current American criminal justice system ignores this fact and instead engages 
in retribution: “instead of helping prisoners locate or maintain a job, find a residence, or locate 
needed drug treatment services, the new parole system is bent on surveillance and detection.”108 
With retribution as a focus, crime policy has transitioned into “harsher sentences for a broader 
range of offenses.” This broader range of offenses began to include non-violent crimes, such as 
drug offenses.109
Racial discrimination has resulted in African-Americans being uniquely affected by the 
criminal justice system as seen by their disproportionate criminal status in comparison to their 
overall U.S. population. The concentration on retribution has not only increased the number of 
prisoners, but it has also increased the number of felons. The U.S. is beyond comparison in its 
“scope and impact of [its] disenfranchisement laws,” which affect 5.3 million people.
  As a result of retribution, the prison population among varied groups has 
expanded, but this has especially been the case for African-Americans.  
110
                                                 
108 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 24. 
 As 
described in my introduction, African-Americans are incarcerated at a much higher rate than any 
other group and as a result are disproportionately affected by felon laws. In addition African-
Americans are also uniquely restricted under these laws. For instance, much of the employment 
that is barred under felon laws includes jobs that are African-Americans highly occupy. In 
addition to this racialized barring of employment, the impact of a felon record on African-
Americans’ chances of being hired for a non-barred job are even more dire than for their White 
counterparts. Job growth is also more concentrated in suburbs than in inner-cities and as seen 
109 Pager, Devah, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (The University of 
Chicago Press 2007) 11.  
110 Requests for Hearing in Sentencing Project: 
<http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_IACHRHearingRequest.pdf> 
previously in my agency chapter, African-Americans are highly concentrated in these low job 
growth inner-cities due to racial segregation. As a result, African-Americans are marginalized 
from much of the available employment. Therefore, due to racial discrimination, African-
Americans’ criminal agency is uniquely restricted, thus requiring a new method for analyzing 
agency that would recognize this restriction. 
As seen in the history chapter, the influence of racial discrimination has for a very long 
time, been a major influence for determining African-Americans’ agency, criminal 
responsibility, and punishment within courts. Due to this racial influence, I saw that there was a 
need to establish a new definition of agency that would acknowledge this fact. This is why I 
focused on African-Americans in my research. The racial discrimination that this group faces 
within the criminal justice system is unparalleled. My definition of agency shows how racial 
discrimination causes a train of effects that limit the agency of African-Americans, including 
environmental restrictions. The idea of agency has been debated for many years and in 
developing my own definition of this long debated topic, it was necessary for me to build on 
these other established definitions of agency. Unlike these other definitions, I included the 
effects of racism. Using my definition of agency, I want to pursue real policy changes within the 
criminal justice system as well as among other institutions that the criminal justice system 
indirectly affects such as public education and employment. 
William Washington’s case shows the dire need for policy changes within the criminal 
justice system as well as within the institutions that it affects. Although the record of 
Washington’s case is limited in terms of the identification of his race and exact environment, I 
was able to speculate as to what his situation may have looked like if his race and environment 
were known. This speculation showed that African-American felons are more disadvantaged 
than their White counterparts. It also showed that African-Americans are disproportionately 
affected by impoverished, urban areas that lack highly-valued options including necessary 
rehabilitation services for ex-offenders. As a result of racial discrimination, most particularly 
discrimination of Blacks, African-Americans’ criminal agency is limited more so than any other 
group. If one is denied employment due to one’s race, it makes it hard for that person to exercise 
his or her agency as s/he desires. The denial of employment due to a felon record creates this 
same difficulty, but when coupled with racial discrimination, one’s agency is further limited and 
often leads to the choice of crime as an alternative. I speculated this double jeopardy effect of 
race and a felon record with William Washington. I showed when one’s environment fosters 
crime rather than sufficient employment, this restrictive environment becomes an influential 
factor on one’s criminal actions. These three barriers—racial discrimination, a felon record, and 
a restrictive environment—create a unique restriction on African-Americans’ agency. It then 
seems that the overrepresentation of African-Americans within the criminal justice system is due 
to a lack of acknowledgement of this unique restriction on their agency. If the criminal justice 
system views many of the criminal actions of African-Americans as a potency to be criminals--as 
they did with William Washington--rather than a restriction in agency, then the disproportionate 
criminal status of this group becomes justified. However, this conclusion is problematic. Even if 
race is removed from being an influential factor within the criminal justice system—which often-
times results in harsher sentencing for African-Americans, it is still apparent that race plays a 
major part in determining the life choices for many African-Americans well before they even 
enter a courtroom as shown by the lack of highly-valued options in their environments. This fact 
was also noted in my introduction by scholar Bruce Western from his book Punishment and 
Inequality in America in which he argued that poverty is one of the major causes for African-
Americans’ mass incarceration.  Due to this finding, it becomes important to push for policy 
changes that would recognize this unique agency of African-Americans in order to stop the 
injustice of their alarming overrepresentation within the criminal justice system. 
Some may argue that creating a new policy that would cater to African-Americans’ 
unique agency is problematic since it echoes a “separate, but equal” rhetoric. In order to avoid a 
“separate, but equal” system for African-Americans, my definition of agency is flexible enough 
to be applied to all. Essentially, my definition of agency argues for a policy change in how legal 
actors interpret sufficient agency. Through the recognition of previously unexplored factors that 
inhibit agency and coerces criminal activity—such as one’s environmental history and the 
restrictive impact of felon laws—this can be done. For instance, if William Washington is a 
White man whose environment lacked sufficient highly-valued options that limited his ability to 
refrain from criminal activities, then his agency would be restricted just as any other who has 
been subjected to such an environment and the same goes for felony restrictions on agency. The 
only difference is that the mark of Black skin further limits one’s agency when this race is 
discriminated against in areas such as employment and felon laws. This was discovered by 
Devah Pager in his Milwaukee study when he found that African-American felons were at a 
greater disadvantaged than their White counterparts. The effect of racial discrimination also 
affects one’s environment and the availability of highly-valued options as seen in Pager’s study 
of the high job-growth rate in suburban areas rather than inner-cities in which the majority of 
African-Americans reside. I propose policy changes within the criminal justice system that 
would require legal actors to recognize these various limits on agency, including racial 
discrimination, in their decisions of criminal responsibility. A person’s whole history and not just 
their criminal history should be considered. Therefore, when assigning criminal responsibility 
through the analysis of the “history, nature and circumstances” of the offender and his or her 
criminal action, these limiting factors should be taken into account.  
Another policy change that I propose involves changes in felon laws. As shown, felon 
laws have unequal restrictions on ex-offenders that highlight the influence of racial 
discrimination. I argue that felon laws should have equal effects on all felons, which would 
require lifting restrictions on the most basic forms of employment and educational opportunities 
that disproportionately affect African-Americans. In other words, this new policy would lift the 
barring on the barber and plumber trades as well as on federal financial aid, which specifically 
target drug-offenders. I also propose that the requirement for felons to include their criminal 
history on job applications be a voluntary decision instead. As seen in Devah Pager’s Milwaukee 
study, a felon record puts felons at an extreme disadvantaged when applying for employment—
regardless of their skills or educational history.  In the arena of voting, I propose that felon 
restrictions are uplifted in order to allow the felon sufficient agency in their life circumstances. 
Felon laws should not coerce further criminal activity, but instead help felons reintegrate into the 
broader society and this can only be done if the insurmountable restrictions that it place on ex-
offenders are removed.  
I also propose policy changes regarding rehabilitation services. Often-times ex-offenders 
are thrust back into restrictive environments without a sense of security, and crime becomes a 
means for obtaining that security out of desperation. As Newark’s mechanics training school 
founder Rich Liebler stated: “It takes at least a year to ‘deprogram’ the felons. Most have never 
owned an alarm clock — months can pass before they show up for class on time — and few can 
name a family member with a regular job.’ ‘We treat them as if they were in a cult,’ he said. ‘We 
have to reverse the thought process they’ve grown up into.’”111
I also argue that sufficient rehabilitation services should be available not only when these 
ex-offenders are released from prisons, but also while they are in prison in order to ensure an 
effective re-integration. As mentioned, since the early 1970’s rehabilitation services within 
prisons are almost obsolete as the focus has transitioned from rehabilitation to retribution. I argue 
for required rehabilitation services within prisons including specialized counseling, job training, 
education, and drug rehabilitation. Rehabilitation services within prisons would also make it 
 Liebler pointed out the 
importance of rehabilitation services in changing the habit of criminal activity among ex-
offenders who have grown accustomed to restrictive environments that foster crime. I speculated 
this habitual effect by perpetual crime with William Washington. Rehabilitation services are 
needed to help end this habit. In order for this proposal to be effective, I argue that rehabilitation 
services should be proportion to population and crime rates.  For instance, if an area has a high 
crime rate and a high ex-offender population, then there should be sufficient rehabilitation 
services to fulfill the high need within that community. Currently, what is seen is an unequal 
distribution of rehabilitation services between African-American and White communities. 
Requiring equal proportions of rehabilitation services will offset this inequality. Crime heavily 
rests within impoverished, urban areas and therefore, these areas should receive more 
rehabilitation services in order to offset a repeat in crimes. As stated before, these areas are 
where African-Americans are overrepresented, and providing sufficient rehabilitation services 
within these areas may also decrease African-Americans’ overrepresentation within the criminal 
justice system.  
                                                 




easier for ex-offenders to be susceptible to rehabilitation outside of prison. Rehabilitation 
services within and outside of prisons have shown to be very effective at preventing further 
crimes. This too may diminish the overrepresentation of African-Americans within the criminal 
justice system.  
Some may question how these rehabilitation services will be funded.  My final proposal 
argues for a redistribution of state funding from penal systems to public school systems in order 
to fund these necessary rehabilitation services. In my introduction, I showed how states’ public 
education funding suffers at the expense of increases in the funding of prisons. This fact is 
disturbing considering there have been studies that have shown that increases in educational 
funding actually prevent future crime. Schools with insufficient funding birth high-school 
dropouts and high-school drop-outs often lead a life of crime. It seems then that a vicious cycle 
occurs; while public schools are defunded, much of their student population drop-out and as a 
result, the criminal justice system is funded to accommodate these high-school drop-outs.  The 
reversal of states’ funding from their prisons to the public schools will provide the highly-valued 
option of education in disadvantaged communities—thus increasing the agency of those that 
reside within those areas.  
In accordance with the increased spending of prisons at the expense of public schools is 
the global mechanism called the prison industrial complex, which takes funding away from 
impoverished, urban areas where sufficient employment is greatly needed. At the 2007 Women’s 
Resource Center conference on the prison industrial complex, scholar and activist Angela Davis 
called this complex a “massive apparatus with global dimensions that profits from the 
incarceration of human beings…[which] goes beyond the notion that punishment stems from 
crime.”112 Davis explains how prisoners are used as cheap labor for the benefit of corporations 
and how this economic benefit creates an incentive for the state to create crime. This creating of 
crime involves characterizing some actions as criminal acts that were previously not thought of 
as crime in earlier decades. In other words, the imprisonment of individuals is not just about 
crime, but about maximizing profits for corporations and states. She explains how there are 
“other forces on the punishment process…especially racism...especially sexism…[these 
concepts] have deployed the concept of a prison industrial complex.”113 Davis recognizes that 
factors such as racism have a huge influence on the incrimination of individuals. This idea is 
reminiscent of my own argument of racial discrimination as a hindrance on one’s criminal 
agency. Davis agrees with Pager in arguing that this massive incarceration since the 1970s was 
due to the inclusion of non-violent crimes in the criminal justice system such as drug use.114
An example of this prison industrial complex is that of the Los Angeles based factory 
U.S. Technologies, which closed its plant to the general public and moved it to the nearby 
correctional facility. An article from the news of Worcester Polytechnic Institute titled “Prison 
Labor Cheats Society” explains how “prisons in impoverished areas often end up with inmates 
from the local area who had previously worked in the community.”
 Due 
to this inclusion of crimes previously not considered as crime and its disparate effect on African-
Americans, it is no wonder why Davis believes these new policies were racially motivated.   
115
                                                 
112 As quoted in Archives.org: <http://www.archive.org/details/Angela_Davis_-_Prison_Industrial_Complex> 
 This article shows how 
prisons are funded at the expense of much needed employment. In fact, this increase in prison 
funding is encouraged. According to the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, state corrections 
agencies advertise prison labor and specifically in California, “inmates who work for the private 
113 As quoted in Archives.org: <http://www.archive.org/details/Angela_Davis_-_Prison_Industrial_Complex> 
114 As quoted in Archives.org: <http://www.archive.org/details/Angela_Davis_-_Prison_Industrial_Complex> 
115 Worcester Polytechnic Institute News: <http://www.wpi.edu/News/TechNews/010327/prisonlabor.shtml> 
corrections called the Prison Industrial Authority, earn wages between 30 and 95 cents per hour 
before required deductions for restitutions and fines.”116
Some may argue that the use of cheap prison labor and its privatization is beneficial. 
According to Robert D. Atkinson from the Progressive Policy Institute, prison labor reduces 
recidivism and supports the overall economy
 This low wage shows the incentives of 
corporations and states to exploit prison labor instead of employing citizens from the general 
population, which would allow for an economic growth in impoverished, urban areas that lack 
highly-valued options. Thus, this privatization and the use of cheap prison labor often lead to 
more crime as highly-valued options are stripped from these vulnerable environments. According 
to Angela Davis and Devah Pager, crime is often created in order to satisfy the interest of the 
state and participating corporations. In order to fund my policy initiative, I argue for the end of 
exploiting prison labor and for corporations that participate in the prison industrial complex be 
required to provide employment in disadvantaged neighborhoods where most of these prisoners 
often derive. This would provide much needed highly-valued options such as rehabilitation 
services in the area and greatly reduce crime. 
117 and Stephen McFarland, Chris McGowen, and 
Tom O’Toole from Cornell University argue that the privatization of corrections leads to 
improving the quality of the services provided without increasing the costs or decreasing the 
quality of services.118
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  According to Atkinson, prison labor provides job training to inmates, 
which helps to reduce recidivism because the ex-offender will have skills necessary to maintain 
117 Atkinson, Robert D.. “Prison Labor: Its More Than Breaking Rocks.” May 2002: 3:  
<http://www.ppionline.org/documents/prison_labor_502.pdf> 
118 McFarland, Stephen, Chris McGowen, Tom O’Toole. “Prisons, Privatization, and Public Values.” Cornell 
University, Restructuring Local Governments: 
<http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/html/PrisonsPrivatization.htm#_Introduction> 
employment,119
As a part of my policy initiative, I argue for the end of the exploitation of prisoners and a 
push for corporate responsibility in surrounding communities. I propose that instead of using 
prisoners for their own selfish economic gain, corporations and states should provide sufficient 
 and according to Atkinson, this output by the inmate benefits the nation’s 
economy. I argue that while the nation’s GDP benefits from prison labor, the inmate or ex-
offender and his or her specific community does not. As I have shown, the environments from 
which many of these inmates derive birthed their criminal activity. In other words, the economic 
benefit that the nation as a whole is supposedly enjoying does not reach the impoverished, urban 
environments that forever lack highly-valued options. These areas are marginalized from this so-
called increase in GDP and without providing actual economic benefits such as sufficient 
employment within these impoverished environments, the inmate may find him or herself back 
in a life of crime, which leads to further exploitation of their labor once they return to prison.  As 
a result, the only players that are winning in the increasing of GDP are the prisons, corporations, 
and the wealthy—not the prisoners or their communities. In regards to the prisoner gaining 
employment skills while participating in prison labor, I argue that these skills go to waste once 
these prisoners are placed in the same restrictive environments as before. Without sufficient 
employment on the outside, the ex-offender cannot exercise his or her newfound skills. 
According to McFarland, etc. al, the privatization of labor increases the efficiency of the 
corporations’ services and products. The increasing of the efficiency of these products and 
services only benefits the corporations and not the prisoners or their communities. This 
privatized prison labor does not put money into much needed communities nor does it help the 
prisoner since a large majority of their wages is taken for restitution.  
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employment in areas that they often neglect, which are many times impoverished, urban areas as 
shown by the large suburban job-growth. Instead of funding and creating new prisons, there 
should be a push for better schools, sufficient employment, and other rehabilitation services in 
areas that need these goods the most. In adopting my policy initiatives, I predict that the mass 
incarceration of all groups will be drastically reduced and therefore resulting in the decrease of 
African-Americans’ disproportionate criminal status.   
There is much change needed within the current American criminal justice system in 
order to reverse the overrepresentation of African-Americans within this system. The cause of 
this phenomenon is numerous and the concept of agency is very complex. I understand that my 
definition of agency is easier established as a theory, but that does not mean it is impracticable. 
As I have shown in the William Washington’s case, my definition of agency can be applied to 
affect the turnout of a defendant’s criminal responsibility. Although there are many factors that 
contribute to the overrepresentation of African-Americans within the criminal justice system, the 
concept of race and its limiting effects should be among those factors. I have shown that these 
factors contribute to a reduction in one’s agency. My definition of agency can be applied to any 
case involving environmental restrictions and limitations from coercive criminal factors such as 
felon laws. I show the effects of race on these limitations in order to argue for a specific re-
evaluation of African-Americans’ agency in hopes of overturning their grossly 
overrepresentation within the criminal justice system. Due to race, African-Americans are 
uniquely affected by these limitations and this should be acknowledged when examining 
African-American defendants’ full history and the nature and circumstances of the crime. This is 
important for ensuring equal justice and a reversal of the 40% African-American population 
within the criminal justice system versus their overall 12% population in the U.S. Therefore, in 
answering my overarching question of whether or not current legal interpretations are sufficient 
for analyzing the agency and criminal responsibility of African-Americans, I argue that they are 
not and will continue to be insufficient as long as these legal actors neglect to recognize the 
limitations of agency by racial discrimination and its effects on factors such as the availability of 
highly-valued options in one’s environment.  As Fred Davie of a non-profit group based in 
Philadelphia states:  “’Up until now, the focus has been putting ex-offenders back in jail… We 
need a national approach to what has become a national crisis.’”120
 
 Approaching African-
Americans’ agency in light of various restrictions is necessary for understanding the complexity 
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